By George Pullen, MilkyWayEconomy
Abstract
This article advances a novel conceptual framework—the Polar–Lunar Continuum—arguing that the Arctic Circle and the lunar south pole constitute a single geoeconomic theater of competition between the United States and China. While traditionally analyzed as separate terrestrial and extraterrestrial domains, both environments share identical economic constraints, logistical challenges, and strategic resource characteristics. As such, they form an integrated frontier of extreme-environment industrialization. This framework reveals the structural unity of two geographically distant regions and highlights the strategic necessity for the United States to treat Arctic and lunar development as mutually reinforcing endeavors. The analysis offers implications for national strategy, governance, and the future architecture of the global economy.
Introduction
Conventional geopolitical analysis separates the Arctic and the Moon into distinct strategic arenas. The former is framed as a terrestrial zone of emerging resource extraction, melting sea routes, and regional security concerns; the latter is treated as the aspirational domain of space science and exploration. This bifurcated logic obscures the underlying economic and operational similarities binding these domains together.
This article proposes that the Arctic Circle and the lunar south pole are best understood not as discrete frontiers but as components of a single, continuous geoeconomic system. This system is shaped by identical constraints—extreme cold or vacuum, remoteness, high logistical costs, resource density, environmental fragility, and reliance on autonomous technologies. Viewed through this lens, the competition between the United States and China across both regions reveals a unified strategic pattern.
The Polar–Lunar Continuum: A New Analytical Framework
The Polar–Lunar Continuum posits that two conditions must be met for distant regions to belong to the same strategic system: (1) shared structural constraints, and (2) shared strategic incentives. Both conditions exist in the Arctic and on the Moon.
Shared Structural Constraints
Both domains are defined by:
- scarce and expensive energy inputs
- extreme-environment engineering requirements
- limited human presence and reliance on autonomous systems
- high capital intensity and long amortization timelines
- sensitive ecosystems or regolith environments requiring novel governance
- logistical vulnerability and minimal redundancy
When the economics governing two locations are identical, distance ceases to be a meaningful differentiator. The cost curves, operational playbooks, and risk profiles converge.
Shared Strategic Incentives
Both regions contain resources foundational to 21st-century industrial power. The Arctic hosts rare earth elements, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and hydrocarbons critical to electronics, energy storage, and advanced manufacturing. The lunar south pole contains water ice (convertible to propellant), helium-3, ilmenite, and other materials essential to long-term space mobility and in-situ manufacturing. The strategic logic is identical: the nation that secures resource sovereignty in extreme environments gains leverage over global supply chains.
China’s Unifying Strategy Across Both Domains
China intuitively treats the Arctic and the Moon as a single developmental axis. Its Polar Silk Road investments—ice-capable vessels, LNG terminals, autonomous research stations, and Arctic satellite architecture—serve dual purposes:
- strengthening energy and mineral security on Earth, and
- building the engineering and logistical competencies required for extraterrestrial industrialization.
The Arctic becomes China’s training ground for lunar ambitions.
Arctic Infrastructure as Lunar Proof-of-Concept
Capabilities refined in the polar north (remote operations, autonomous mining, modular construction, resilient power systems) map directly onto lunar requirements. The learning curves are shared. The amortized strategic value compounds across both theaters.
Lunar Resources as Long-Term Geoeconomic Leverage
Lunar water ice enables propellant production, reusable cislunar transport, and permanent settlement. These functions extend China’s reach across space-based logistics networks, allowing new forms of communication, surveillance, and industrial activity that ultimately reinforce influence on Earth. China’s strategy links Earth’s northern pole and the Moon’s southern pole into a single industrial architecture.
The U.S. Strategic Gap
The United States maintains strong domain-specific leadership but lacks a unified Polar–Lunar strategy. Arctic development is fragmented across agencies, while lunar planning remains largely isolated within NASA and the Space Force. This separation creates avoidable inefficiencies. To achieve lunar permanence, the United States must:
- treat Arctic industrialization as prerequisite training
- integrate extreme-environment R&D across agencies
- invest in dual-use infrastructure capable of supporting both domains
- develop governance norms that preempt adversarial exploitation
Failure to lead in the Arctic will hinder leadership on the Moon.
Strategic Implications
The Polar–Lunar Continuum reframes the competition not as separate contests but as a structural race to master extreme-environment industrialization. The nation capable of:
- extracting critical minerals in the Arctic, and
- producing propellant and materials on the Moon will define the energy, mobility, and manufacturing architecture of the mid-21st century.
Thus: The Arctic is the capstone of the old industrial world; the Moon is the foundation of the new one. The power that bridges them will write the economic rules of the next century.
Conclusion
The Arctic and the lunar south pole are not two theaters but a shared frontier united by economic constraints, strategic resources, and the ambitions of global powers. Recognizing the Polar–Lunar Continuum is essential for designing coherent U.S. policy. China has already adopted an integrated view; the United States must respond with equal strategic cohesion or risk disadvantage across both domains.
GEORGE PULLEN’S OFFICIAL DISCLAIMER
This essay on the "Polar–Lunar Continuum" does not relate to my official position with the US Government. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 209 the teaching, speaking and writing around this collection of essays are not undertaken as part of my official duties. I was not invited by a related party to write on these topics, but rather took the initiative to write on the Polar-Lunar Continum given my personal interest, research and expertise in the topic and as a continuation of my research on Blockchain and The Space Economy. Members of the public should know clearly that this is not a product of any agency's official speech or official position but undertaken as the exercise of my free speech as a citizen of the United States.
Further, the content does not relate to my official duties because it is not a topic of my presently assigned duties as a Senior Economist for the CFTC or any of my duties within the past year. The information conveyed also does not draw upon nonpublic CFTC information or substantially on ideas or official data that are nonpublic information as defined in § 2635.